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SHOWCASING DIVERSITY*
PATRICK S. SHIN* & MITU GULATI
Diversity initiatives are commonplace in today's corporate America.
Large and successful firms frequently tout their commitments to
diversity, sometimes appointing women and racial minorities to highly
visible posts, including seats on their boards of directors. Why would a
profit-minded firm go out of its way to engage in such behavior? One
frequently voiced explanation is that by creating such diversity, firms
send out a positive signal about their attributes: a firm's willingness to
expend resources on diversity shows its commitment to workplace
fairness and equality, which makes it more attractive to potential
employees, customers, and financiers. This claim has considerable
surface appeal not only as an explanatory thesis, but as a rationale that
conveniently bridges the normative gap between corporate self-interest
and the promotion of social justice. In this Article, we raise some
difficulties with the theory of diversity-as-signal in terms of both its
explanatory adequacy and its normative implications.
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INTRODUCTION
Large firms in the United States today appear to regard
increasing the diversity of their workforces as an important goal.'
Corporations like Verizon, Intel, and Walmart tout their diversity
initiatives on their websites.2 CEOs look to add diversity among
senior managers, law firms seek to add diversity in their partnership
ranks, and universities seek diverse candidates to install as deans and
chancellors. Observers and analysts, meanwhile, stand ready to rank
these institutions on these efforts-presumably to meet a marketplace
demand for such information.3 Diversity has become a matter of
corporate strategy4 and even of concern to financial markets.5 Yet, at
1. According to a recent survey of Fortune 500 companies, some ninety-five percent
of those polled said that senior management viewed increasing workforce diversity as a
"major goal." National Survey Reveals Workplace Diversity Is Critical in Attracting and
Retaining Talent, CUNA HUMAN RES. / TRAINING & DEV. COUNCIL (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://www.cunahrtdcouncil.org/news/3131.html.
2. In an April 2010 news release, Verizon boasted that it had been named by
Diversity MBA Magazine as "among the top companies for board of directors' diversity"
and that "[w]omen and people of color constitute nearly half of Verizon's Board of
Directors, and ... nearly 60 percent of the company's workforce." Verizon Ranked No. 4
on Diversity MBA Magazine's List of Best Companies for Diverse Managers, VERIZON
NEWS CENTER (Apr. 20, 2010), http://newscenter.verizon.com/press-releases/verizon/2010/
verizon-ranked-no-4-on.html. For websites containing similar content, see Diversity,
WALMARTSTORES.COM, http://walmartstores.com/diversity/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011)
and Intel Diversity, INTEL, http://www.intel.com/about/companyinfo/diversitylindex.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
3. See, e.g., Sonia Alleyne & Annya M. Lott, 40 Best Companies for Diversity: They
Want You!, BLACK ENTERPRISE, July 2010, at 92, 94-100, available at
http://www.blackenterprise.com/diversity/2010/06/15/they-want-you/; Luke Visconti, The
2010 DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity, DIVERSITYINC, June 2010, at 18, 18,
available at http://www.diversityinc-digital.com/diversityincmedia/201006#pgl. The
companies listed in these rankings frequently tout their high position in the rankings on
their websites. See, e.g., Black Enterprise Includes Marriott in Top "40 Best Companies for
Diversity," MARRIOTT NEWS CENTER (June 29, 2010), http://news.marriott.com/2010/06/
black-enterprise-includes-marriott-in-top-40-best-companies-for-diversity.html; Black
Enterprise Names MGM Resorts International to List of Nation's "40 Best Companies for
Diversity," MGM RESORTS INT'L (July 7, 2010), http://www.mgmresortsdiversity.com/
pressreleases 07_17_10.asp; Burger King Corp. Named One of "40 Best Companies for
Diversity" by Black Enterprise Magazine, BURGER KING INVESTOR REL. (Aug. 27, 2010),
http://investor.bk.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=87140&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1464427
&highlight=; Toyota Named Among Best Companies for Diversity by Black Enterprise,
TOYOTA USA NEWSROOM (June 28, 2010), http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-
named-among-best-companies-161014.aspx.
4. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of
Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1590 (2001); Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing
Work: "Diversity," Discrimination, and Integration, 59 EMORY L.J. 585, 595-97 (2010);
Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management:
Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM. BEHAv. SCI. 960,
972-74 (1998).
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the same time, ongoing research in social psychology suggests that
negative attitudes toward members of racial minority groups are
pervasive, persistent, and often imperceptible to the very individuals
who possess them.6 And looming in the background is uncertainty
about the implications of recent developments in employment
discrimination law for the legal permissibility of affirmative efforts to
enhance workplace diversity.' So, what explains the contemporary
enthusiasm for diversity?
One of the explanations given by corporate board members
themselves is that diversity efforts send a positive message about their
institutions-for example, that their companies are headed in the
right direction, are socially responsible, or care about egalitarian
norms and social justice.' Diversity is, according to this rationale,
desirable as a signal of a socially upstanding corporation.9
5. The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently mandated that companies
disclose whether they consider diversity as a factor in selecting their board members. See
17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010) (requiring as part of Regulation S-K the disclosure of
how diversity is considered in the process by which candidates for director are considered
for nomination); see also Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343
(Dec. 23, 2009) (noting with approval arguments that "disclosure about board diversity ...
would provide investors with information on corporate culture and governance practices
that would enable investors to make more informed voting and investment decisions,"
"that there appears to be a meaningful relationship between diverse boards and improved
corporate financial performance, and that diverse boards can help companies more
effectively recruit talent and retain staff").
6. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The
Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV.
1893, 1895-98 (2009) (describing instances of unconscious discrimination); Anthony G.
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 945, 952-53 (2006) (describing the Implicit Association Test which suggests that
Americans have an implicit or unconscious "attitudinal preference" for Caucasians over
African Americans); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral
Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1072-75 (2006)
(describing studies linking implicit attitudes with discriminatory behavior); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1213-16
(1995) (describing studies that support the conclusion that discrimination results from
unconscious cognitive biases).
7. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of
Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1447-48 (2006) (analyzing Grutter
v. Bollinger and the use of affirmative action in the workplace); Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci's
Color-Blind Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended Consequences?
35-40 (Dec. 29, 2009) (unpublished draft), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=1529438 (analyzing Ricci v. DeStefano and the implications of the "color
blind" standard for discrimination law).
8. See Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board
Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008).
9. E.g., Green, supra note 4, at 598 (according to the prevailing business narrative,
"[r]ace and sex are relevant primarily as means of serving markets and of signaling a
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In this Article, we examine this signaling rationale for the pursuit
of corporate diversity."o After explaining the basic idea behind the
signaling thesis, we explore some difficulties with it. By observing a
distinction between the condition of diversity and explicit behaviors
that signal attitudes about diversity, we propose a modified version of
the signaling thesis that more plausibly identifies the explicit
behaviors that perform a genuine signaling function in connection
with workplace diversity. Finally, we set forth normative and legal
objections to the signaling rationale as a justification for diversity
hiring and contrast it with other consequentialist grounds of
justification. We argue that thinking of diversity in terms of its
signaling function potentially undermines the genuine, good reasons
that we have for valuing the presence and development of diversity in
institutional contexts.
I. DIVERSITY AS A SIGNAL
A. The Value of Diversity
From the perspective of a philosophical theory of value, there
are at least two ways in which we can think of the value of racial
diversity in a firm's workforce." First, we might think of its value as
primarily instrumental in nature; that is, as a function of its usefulness
in the service of further ends, but not as something valuable in itself.
Valuing diversity in a workforce because of its expected positive
consequences for worker productivity, morale, or responsiveness to
customers are examples of valuing diversity in an instrumental way.12
Second, we can also think of diversity as having noninstrumental
value; in other words, as something that is itself worth caring about,
regardless of any further consequences that it might tend to
produce." For example, we might believe that diversity is constitutive
of the good of a community, or that valuing diversity in various
commitment to diversity and adherence to egalitarian norms and laws").
10. For skepticism regarding other arguments in favor of focusing resources on
achieving racial diversity at the top of an institution rather than at the bottom, see Devon
W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do
When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1662 (2004) (theorizing that
diversity in corporate governance "will neither racially reform the corporation, nor" open
doors "for the minorities on the bottom").
11. See generally Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1175
(comparing the respective value of racial diversity and "colorblindness").
12. See id. at 1191-95.
13. See id. at 1183-84.
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institutional settings is a necessary concomitant of being committed to
a certain ideal of justice or equality.14
Most people who care about diversity probably do so for a
variety of reasons, both instrumental and noninstrumental. The topic
of interest to us here is one particular theory of the value of
diversity-the evidential or signaling theory-that is best
characterized as an instrumental one." In limiting our discussion to
this particular theory, we do not wish to suggest that other
approaches to conceptualizing the value of diversity, including
noninstrumental ones, are unimportant or, for that matter, immune
from criticism. 6 We focus on the signaling theory of the value of
diversity because it seems to have explanatory power in the context of
the economics of the workplace," yet at the same time is sufficiently
underdeveloped as to reward some searching inquiry.
In Parts I.B and I.C, we explain some basic concepts from
signaling theory generally, and then describe how that theory might
be adapted to help explain why rational actors might attach positive
value to the presence of diversity in the workplace.
B. Signaling: Basic Concepts
The notion of a signal is intuitively familiar. Many decisions in
the workplace depend on judgments about characteristics of people
and institutions that are difficult to observe or demonstrate directly
and cannot reliably be discerned by straightforward inquiry or report.
Consider a characteristic as basic as the propensity to work hard.
Employers naturally have reason to favor employees who are hard
14. See id. at 1199-1201.
15. See id. at 1195-99.
16. See, e.g., Carbado & Gulati, supra note 10, at 1662. See generally Shin, supra note
11, at 1199 (presenting arguments for and against valuing racial diversity in a
noninstrumental way).
17. For discussions of the signaling rationale for diversity initiatives from a variety of
other perspectives, see generally Carol T. Kulik & Loriann Roberson, Diversity Initiative
Effectiveness: What Organizations Can (and Cannot) Expect from Diversity Recruitment,
Diversity Training, and Formal Mentoring Programs, in DIVERSITY AT WORK 265, 274
(Arthur P. Brief ed., 2008) (reviewing the research on diversity and concluding that
"presenting diverse employees and pro-diversity statements in recruiting materials sends a
signal to the applicant that the organization values diversity"); Toyah Miller & Maria del
Carmen Triana, Demographic Diversity in the Boardroom: Mediators of the Board
Diversity-Firm Performance Relationship, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 755 (2009) (using signaling
theory to understand the relationship between board diversity and firm performance);
Valerie Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal
Threat or Safety for African Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 615 (2008) (suggesting that a firm's diversity can send signals to specific
subgroups, such as African Americans).
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workers, and employees have reason to convince their employers that
they are. But a propensity for hard work is not something that can be
directly observed, and any claim by an employee to be a hard worker
would be too self-serving to be reliable. Thus, an employee who
wants to communicate her propensity for hard work to her employer
(maybe she is in a probationary position or is seeking a promotion)
will have to figure out ways to send signals-clear, reliable
messages-that provide evidence of that characteristic." She might,
for example, regularly stay late at the office or show up early
(depending on when there are others present to observe these
actions). She might send work-related e-mails in the early hours of
the morning or produce reports that are voluminous and exhaustive.
These are discrete, directly observable behaviors that tend to
evidence an underlying general propensity to "work hard," which is
itself a vague, context-dependent concept that resists specification.
The visible behaviors, therefore, can serve as signals of the more
abstract underlying characteristic.19
Not all signals have the same quality or value. There are negative
signals as well as positive signals, weak signals as well as strong ones.20
Context is important. Behavior that is intended to send a particular
signal may not always succeed in doing so. For example, sending
work-related e-mails late at night to colleagues may simply annoy
them, especially if they suspect that there is no substance underlying
the attempted signal. Staying late at the office on a consistent basis
when the work in question can be completed in a relatively short time
might indicate that the employee is slow. Producing unnecessarily
voluminous reports might suggest that the employee has bad
judgment.21
Signals can also perform different functions. Some, which might
be called separation signals, are aimed at setting the sender apart
18. The form of intentional, strategic behavior we are discussing here is a somewhat
specialized case of signaling. For a more general discussion of signaling, see ERIC A.
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000). For an analysis of "signaling systems"
in nature, see BRIAN SKYRMS, SIGNALS: EVOLUTION, LEARNING, & INFORMATION 22-
32 (2010) (describing how certain behaviors by vervet monkeys can be understood as
signals warning of the presence of various types of predators).
19. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259, 1260-63 (2000).
20. E.g., John G. Riley, Weak and Strong Signals, 104 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 213,
214 (2002).
21. In other words, the actual informational content of a signaling behavior may be
different from what the sender of the signal intends to communicate through that
behavior. See SKYRMS, supra note 18, at 9, 44-45.
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from others.22 Serving a tennis ball at 100 mph is, for example, a signal
that someone has athletic prowess at tennis. Not anyone can do this,
and probably no one can do it without significant athletic ability and
training. The signal, therefore, when sent early in a game, can
communicate that the player will be an especially worthy and
formidable opponent. The signal is reliable because only those with a
certain level of skill and athletic prowess can send it. Wearing an
Armani suit and driving an exotic sports car can similarly serve to set
someone apart; one typically cannot perform those actions unless one
has money, and lots of it.23
Other signals are meant to demonstrate that the sender is similar
to others. If almost everyone who works in a certain office goes out
for drinks on Friday evenings at a particular bar, a new employee
might choose to take part in that ritual to signal that he is collegial
and values the others' camaraderie. Or the employee might choose to
participate simply to avoid sending the opposite signal; that is, a lack
of collegiality and possible disaffection.
In economic terms, signals work most effectively when they are
relatively cheap to send if one possesses the underlying characteristic
and expensive to send if one does not possess the characteristic.2 4
Consider again the behavior of staying late at the office on a regular
basis as a signal of a propensity to work hard. That is an example of a
good signal. A lazy, leisure-loving person will find it painful to stay
late at work on a regular basis, so sending the signal would be
prohibitively costly for him. The compulsive employee who obsesses
over her work, on the other hand, will attach little personal cost (and
perhaps will derive pleasure from) arranging to spend extra time at
the office, so the opposite would be true for her.
Almost any kind of behavior can function as a signal,25 but there
are at least two features that all effective signaling behaviors share.
First, the behavior must be something that is clearly identifiable (e.g.,
staying at work after hours), compared to the more amorphous
underlying characteristic (e.g., the propensity to work hard) that the
behavior is supposed to signal. A behavior is worthless as a signal if
22. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 20-22.
23. For discussions of "costly signaling," see, for example, John G. Riley,
Informational Equilibrium, 47 ECONOMETRICA 331, 331-60 (1979); Stephen Ross, The
Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON.
23,23 (1977).
24. For a discussion of classic signaling, see Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87
Q.J. ECON. 355, 355 (1973).
25. See SKYRMS, supra note 18, at 7 ("Signals are not endowed with any intrinsic
meaning.").
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the behavior is obscure or difficult to observe. Second, the signaling
behavior must be difficult or costly to exhibit in the absence of the
underlying characteristic that it is supposed to evidence.26 If anyone
can engage in the behavior easily, it will not be a reliable indicator of
any underlying characteristic in particular.
Although the foregoing discussion focuses on signaling behavior
by individuals, institutions and groups can engage in such behavior as
well. The same kinds of incentives that drive signaling behavior in the
individual context apply in the group context. For example, a
company might want to communicate to current and prospective
employees that it is a compassionate employer, promotes work-life
balance, or is patriotic. An employer could, of course, simply tell
observers that it has those characteristics, but again, that kind of self-
serving declaration is not likely to be effective: talk is cheap. Thus, an
employer who wanted observers to believe that it has those kinds of
characteristics might engage in signaling behavior that reliably
evidences them. For example, offering to pay funeral expenses when
the parent or spouse of an employee has passed away might be an
effective signal of compassion. Setting up daycare facilities for
employees with young children might effectively signal a belief in
work-life balance. Making contributions to a veteran's fund might
signal patriotism. And so on.
C. The Signaling Rationale for Diversity
What if an employer wanted observers to perceive it as a
company that fosters a workplace governed by progressive norms of
equality and nondiscrimination under which everyone has a fair
opportunity to succeed, regardless of factors such as race or gender?
Projecting such an image might benefit the employer by making it
easier to recruit employees and perhaps gain customers and business
partners. 27 But "norms" are intangible abstractions, and commitment
to a norm is not a state that can be directly perceived by or exhibited
to observers. One might hypothesize that a desire to communicate a
commitment to socially progressive norms is something that would
drive signaling behavior. How, then, might a corporation signal a
26. See Spence, supra note 24, at 358-59.
27. To borrow from Eric Posner, the employer would be signaling that it had a low
discount rate for the future; that is, that it was in the game for the long term and, as a
result, would play fair. POSNER, supra note 18, at 15-21. For an application of this concept
in the diversity context, see Laura Nyantung Beny, Diversity Among Elite American Law
Firms: A Signal of Quality and Prestige 23-26 (Feb. 24, 2007) (unpublished draft),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=777504.
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commitment to equality or antidiscrimination norms-that is, that it
has a "positive diversity climate," to borrow a helpful term from Tom
Tyler?28
Recent literature discussing why corporations are actively
pursuing the creation of diversity on their boards of directors posits as
a primary reason that the existence of such diversity serves a valuable
signaling function. 29 The idea is that corporate board diversity helps
differentiate the institutions that have it from those that do not.30 The
signaling thesis is that corporations seek to establish diversity on their
boards to demonstrate their commitment to qualities such as fairness,
justice, and equality of opportunity.3 1 In economic terms, an
institution that is willing to spend extra resources to pursue diversity
in its upper echelons, including its board, is signaling that it has an
ethos of fairness and justice. Conversely, an institution that fails to
achieve such diversity might be signaling its disregard of or
indifference to such norms.32
For diversity to function effectively as a separating or
differentiating signal, it must be the case that institutions who care
more about fairness and justice will find it cheaper to pursue diversity
than those institutions that care less about these characteristics. This
argument about differential costs, when unpacked, is questionable.3 3
Broome and Krawiec, in a study of the signaling rationale for board
diversity, find little indication that board diversity helps to
differentiate companies with true commitments to fairness and justice
(or some other similar concept) from those with less dedication to
28. See Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A
Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715, 745 (2011) (characterizing
"positive diversity climate" as including "[i]nterpersonal respect, a proactive attitude
towards diversity, the promotion of an overarching organizational identity, and respect for
subgroup identities").
29. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 8, at 447-48.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. A recent article in the mainstream press discussed the lack of diversity in high-
level posts in New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg's administration, stating that
[m]any employers want a workplace ... that has highly qualified managers who
reflect the broader community .... So failing to name minority employees to high-
level positions, time after time, not only can dampen employee morale, but also
send a message that an employer is insensitive or indifferent, according to political
analysts and human resources professionals.
David W. Chen & Jo Craven McGinty, Setting Diversity as Hallmark, Mayor Falls Far
Short of a Vow, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, at Al.
33. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 8, at 448-52.
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those values.' Board diversity is easy to mimic, they explain, which
means that it likely has little value as a signal of a genuine
commitment to fairness and justice.35
One response to this difficulty with the signaling thesis is to
reframe just what it is that diversity is supposed to signify. One might
argue that a diverse board or a diverse workforce is not a separation
signal, but rather a signal of social cooperation, a signal that a
company is aware of and endorses extant progressive norms of
nondiscrimination and fair equality of opportunity. Thus, firms may
engage in behaviors promoting diversity not to differentiate
themselves from other firms, but simply to signal that they are also
one of the "good types," thereby avoiding any negative inference of a
desire to dissociate themselves from those other firms.
We are getting ahead of ourselves. Whether or not the signaling
thesis about the corporate interest in diversity can withstand scrutiny,
the fact is that it has a great deal of surface plausibility. In the
interviews reported in a series of papers by Broome, Conley, and
Krawiec, board members themselves frequently give a signaling
rationale for why corporations have reason to make their boards of
directors more diverse.36 Broome, Conley, and Krawiec express
skepticism about how well this explanation holds up.3 7 We are also
skeptical, but for different reasons. Specifically, the signaling thesis
presupposes that the fact of diversity itself functions as a signal of
underlying attributes that observers have reason to care about. But
the notion of diversity has an ineffable quality about it; it is a concept
that resists specification or bright-line definition. If that is so, is
diversity even the sort of thing that can sensibly be thought of as a
signal in the sense we have been discussing? An examination of the
signaling thesis about corporate diversity should start by examining
whether diversity as such is the sort of observable state that can
function as a signal in the first place.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 451-52.
36. Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories:
Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REv. 759, 792-93 (2011); John M.
Conley, Lissa L. Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Narratives of Diversity in the Corporate
Boardroom: What Corporate Insiders Say About Why Diversity Matters, in DISCOURSE
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript
at 19-20), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1415803.
37. See Broome et al., supra note 36, at 804-08; Conley et al., supra note 36, at 19-20.
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II. DIVERSITY AS SIGNAL: A CRITIQUE
In the preceding Part, we laid out the hypothesis that employers
and observers have reason to care about the existence of diversity in a
workforce because that state of affairs signals an employment context
characterized by fair equality of opportunity and, more generally, an
ethos of justice and equality." In this Part, we consider some
difficulties with this hypothesis.
"Diversity" is not a technical term. Everyone understands
basically what is meant by the claim that a particular workforce is
diverse or has an absence of diversity. The trouble for the signaling
thesis, however, is that it is difficult to identify concrete, determinate
conditions that would unfailingly cause us to recognize a given
population as diverse. We can, to be sure, say some general things
about what constitutes diversity. Diversity with respect to a given
characteristic is a property of a group of people that describes the
group's heterogeneity with respect to that characteristic. If a group is
completely homogeneous, it cannot be diverse. The less
homogeneous it is, the more diverse it will be. But the diversity of a
group can be itself multifarious, such that a group can be diverse with
respect to one characteristic yet not diverse with respect to another.
And diversity of course admits of degrees, so a group can be more
diverse in a given respect compared to a second group, yet less
diverse in that same respect compared to a third.
None of this should seem particularly controversial. But when we
try to move from these basic generalities toward more specific
definitional conditions, the going gets quite a bit more difficult. One
obvious problem is that it is impossible to say what degree of
heterogeneity with respect to a characteristic must exist before we can
say that a group has diversity in that respect. It is true that sometimes,
when we talk about diversity, we are referring just to the presence of
any level of heterogeneity in a group. Diversity in this minimal
descriptive sense, though, could not possibly be regarded as evidence
of operative norms of equality and nondiscrimination. So the notion
that diversity is a signal of operative norms of fairness and
nondiscrimination implicates a more robust concept of diversity. It is
that more robust concept that resists determinate specification.
The problem, however, is not just that there is some
indeterminacy as a result of vagueness (lack of sharp boundaries) as
to the limits of diversity. It is also that judgments about the diversity
38. See discussion supra Part I.
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of a group seem dependent on somewhat mercurial details of context.
For example, if the workforce of a large company headquartered in
an urban locale with a twenty percent black population were ninety-
five percent white, we might be inclined to say that the company
lacked racial diversity, and we might say that this is so because the
proportion of whites to racial minority groups does not reflect the
proportion observed in the broader community. Yet, if that same
workforce in the same locale were, just to throw out a number, forty
percent black, we would probably say that the company had a great
deal of racial diversity, even though the proportion of white to black
employees still would not match the proportion observed in the
broader community.
Once we notice the context-dependent nature of judgments
about diversity, similar examples become simple to concoct. Suppose
a Fortune 500 company had a predominantly black rank-and-file
employee base, with an all-white managerial team and an all-white
board of directors. One might not be willing to call such a company
racially diverse. Yet, if that same company had a predominantly white
rank-and-file with a predominantly black management team and
majority black board of directors, we would guess that many would
regard that firm as having a significant degree of racial diversity. How
would we characterize a workforce that had a sizable number of racial
minority employees, if all of those minorities happened to be Asian?
Would such a workforce exhibit racial diversity? Even as to sex,
where one would think that diversity could simply be defined by
reference to a 1:1 ratio, matters seem hardly so straightforward. If
thirty percent of the composition of a coal-mining operation were
women, we might say of that company that it had an unusually high
degree of gender diversity, while that same percentage would
probably be thought to reflect low gender diversity on a law school
faculty.
We can also imagine some more fanciful cases. Suppose a
company happened, by chance, to employ a sizable number of
workers, relative to the relevant labor market, who identified
themselves as white but due to their skin color, ancestry, and social
cues would be regarded by most strangers as black. Would we say
that those workers contributed to the company's racial diversity?
What about the opposite case, in which those same workers identified
themselves as black but would be regarded by most strangers as
white? Would we then say of the company that it had racial diversity?
It is not immediately apparent how one ought to answer these
questions-one's response will depend on how one thinks about the
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significance of self-identification in the meaning of race-but what we
want to observe is that the question whether this hypothetical
company possesses racial diversity is not one that can be answered
without some nuanced attention to a number of embedded issues.
Put simply, the meaning of diversity is hard to pin down.39 It
seems quixotic to attempt to identify the truth conditions of claims
about whether a group of people is diverse in any particular respect.
One might be tempted to say that it is possible to know a diverse
workforce when one sees it, but that seems patently false if one takes
even a few of our hypothetical snapshots above seriously.
For the theory of diversity as a signal, the difficulty is rather
acute. Once we recognize that we cannot say of diversity that "we
know it when we see it," it becomes unclear how a group's putative
diversity could function as an effective signal of any underlying state.
If no one can even say exactly what it means for a group of people to
exhibit diversity, then how could any putative exhibition of that
property be a reliable indicator of anything?
As explained above, a particular trait, characteristic, or behavior
has value as a signal of some underlying referent state or
characteristic when that characteristic is itself something we care
about, the signal is reliably correlated with it, and the signal is both
easier to exhibit and to identify than the referent characteristic itself.40
For example, a student's grade point average ("GPA") in college has
value as a signal of an underlying set of referent attributes-let us say
intelligence, diligence, responsibility, and motivation-because GPA
is itself a fact that is much easier to advertise and identify than any of
those attributes.41 It is not at all clear, however, that something similar
can be said of the characteristic of race and gender diversity. Whether
or not a group is diverse is itself a contestable matter subject to
significant disagreement in some or perhaps even most cases.
Part of the difficulty here is that the concept of diversity is not a
purely descriptive one, but one that may also have a normative
component. One might argue that what "diversity" truly refers to is
the kind and degree of heterogeneity that we would expect to see in a
39. Tellingly, a recent report based on a survey by the Society for Human Resource
Management concluded that "[w]hile organizations tend to believe that diversity in the
workplace is important, only 30% [of those surveyed] have an agreed definition of
'diversity.'" Few Organizations Define Diversity, HRM GUIDE (Mar. 4, 2008),
http://www.hrmguide.com/diversity/job-market.htm.
40. See discussion supra Part I.B.
41. And because GPA is not something that can easily be "faked," the risk of GPA
being a false signal is low.
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group if that group had been created under ideal conditions
consistent with justice, fair equality of opportunity, and adherence to
antidiscrimination principles.4 2 On this normative understanding of
the meaning of diversity, the claim that a workforce is racially diverse
cannot be verified through simple, direct observation. It implies that
the group's composition is roughly in line with what we would predict
it to be under certain hypothetical conditions of justice, social
equality, and the absence of local discriminatory practices.43 Those
are obviously normatively loaded concepts, and determining those
hypothetical conditions requires normative work.
In discussions about the significance and meaning of diversity, we
must be careful to avoid slipping in and out of this normative
understanding of the concept. This sort of equivocation may explain
part of the intuitive plausibility of the signaling thesis about the value
of diversity. The thesis, again, is that the diversity of a workforce
functions as a signal, and that the referent state being signaled is that
the employer does not engage in discrimination and is committed to
norms of fairness and equality of opportunity." But if "diversity" is
understood in the normative sense just described, then the thesis is
nearly tautologous. That is, if diversity by definition refers to the kind
and degree of heterogeneity that would be present under ideal
conditions of justice and nondiscrimination, then the assertion that
diversity is a signal of such conditions becomes just a trivial truth that
falls out of its definition-something like saying that a well-balanced
baseball team is a "signal" that the team has good offense, defense,
and pitching.
If it is plausible to posit diversity as evidence of fairness and
equality just because we implicitly understand diversity to mean
heterogeneity as would exist under conditions of fairness and
equality, then the signaling thesis is empirically vacuous. It has the air
of truth because of the conceptual connection between diversity and
conditions of equality justice, but this conceptual connection also
disqualifies the property of diversity as such from serving as a
genuinely useful, information-bearing signal (in the stricter sense of
that term) of those conditions. Because of diversity's normative
component, we cannot even know whether a given group is diverse
unless we can first determine what the composition of the group
would be under ideal conditions of justice and nondiscrimination.
42. See PETER SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 20 (2003) (distinguishing between
"normative" and "descriptive" definitions of diversity).
43. For a discussion of the definition of "diversity," see generally id.
44. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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Once we realize this, it makes little sense to theorize diversity as such
in the role of an evidentially valuable, indirect signal of a state of
justice and equality.
In summary, when we reflect on the vagueness of the notion of
diversity and its character as a normatively loaded construct, it starts
to seem wrongheaded to postulate the putative diversity of a group as
an effective, information-bearing signal of some further, less visible
state of affairs. The property of diversity seems different from the sort
of readily identifiable traits or discrete behaviors that function as
signals in classic examples.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
So diversity is a vague, partly normative, abstractly constructed
concept that does not admit of easy definition. Whether or not a
particular group of people can properly be described as racially or
otherwise diverse is sometimes difficult to answer and might be a
matter of considerable disagreement. It may be impossible to state
with any precision the truth conditions of the assertion that a group is
or is not diverse in any given respect.
Yet, despite these conceptual difficulties with the theory of
diversity as a signal, it is undeniable that employers engage in
practices that seem motivated by a desire to advertise the presence of
women and minorities in their workforces, such as appointing an
individual to a highly visible post such as the board of directors, or
prominently featuring images of minority personnel on the corporate
website or in promotional materials.4 5 How should these practices be
understood? If we are not being careful, we might be tempted to say
that these cases are examples of companies making use of diversity to
signal something desirable about them as employers, vendors, or
business partners; that is, to signal to others that they are one of the
"good types."
In fact, however, the concept of diversity as such is not essential
to a description of what it is that these employers are exhibiting or
putting on display. The employer who prominently features black
employees in its promotional brochures or on its website is in some
general sense advertising its diversity, but it would be a mistake to say
that the employer was exhibiting diversity directly. Exhibiting an
image of an individual who might contribute to the company's
diversity is not equivalent to exhibiting the company's diversity.
45. See, e.g., supra notes 2-3.
46. POSNER, supra note 18, at 18-27.
2011] 1031
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Similarly, a company who places a racial minority on its board of
directors might be motivated by an interest in causing others to form
beliefs about the company's diversity, but having such a person on the
board neither constitutes diversity nor the exhibition of diversity as
such-it is nothing more than the exhibition of an individual member
of a minority group associated with the company, which might or
might not actually enjoy diversity among its constituents.
This simple observation exposes a significant difficulty for the
thesis that diversity functions as a signal of some underlying state.
When a company tries to tout its commitment to progressive norms
by spotlighting particular individuals who are women or racial
minorities, diversity as such is not the characteristic that is
spotlighted, and it is far from certain that observers will perceive the
spotlighted subject as diversity per se. This suggests that thinking of
diversity as a signal involves confusion.
To see the confusion, consider an analogy to a signaling system
involving a homeowner's display of an American flag on his porch on
the Fourth of July. It is straightforward to think of the flag as a signal
for some referent set of characteristics of the homeowner, perhaps
including patriotism and civic pride. We can quibble about the
specifics of what is signaled and how effective that signal is, but a flag
is clearly the sort of thing that can function as a signal. Assuming the
flag is displayed properly and viewing conditions are satisfactory,
there should be no uncertainty about the display that relates to
potential disputes about what it is for something to be a flag, nor
should there be any problem of uptake. Except in unusual cases,
whether something is a flag will not be an open question, and
everyone who notices the flag will perceive it as a flag.
Notice how different the property of diversity is from this
canonical example of the flag-as-signal. Indeed, if we try to map the
property of diversity onto the flag example, it makes much more
sense to think of the analogue to diversity not as the flag (the signal),
but rather as one of the referent attributes, such as patriotism.
Patriotism has a level of vagueness and indeterminacy that is similar
to diversity. Like the concept of diversity, the value of patriotism
might be connected with the value we might place on the underlying
traits we associate with it, such as loyalty and pride. But it would be
unhelpful to conceive of patriotism as a signal for those traits, because
it is too vague and abstract to be the sort of thing that could function
as a signal at all. There is no clear way to exhibit it directly, as there is
no distinct behavior that, if noticed, will necessarily be perceived as a
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display of patriotism as such. Much the same can be said about
diversity.
Diversity, inasmuch as it corresponds to something like
patriotism in the flag analogy, is not the sort of thing that can function
as a signal. This does not mean, however, that the kinds of
employment behaviors we tend to associate with "diversity hiring"-
such as hiring minority personnel to fill visible posts or placing their
images on the corporate website-cannot be explained in terms of a
signaling model. The questions for the application of a signaling
model to these examples, though, are: what exactly is functioning as
the signal (like the flag), and what exactly is the referent state being
signified (like patriotism)?
Our proposed answer is that the employer behavior that
constitutes the signal is the prominent hiring, placement, or
presentation of individuals who are visibly identifiable as women or
members of racial minority groups. We will use the term
"showcasing" as a shorthand to refer to these practices by which an
employer makes its women and minority constituents visible or
otherwise salient to observers. Showcasing behavior can take various
forms. The practices we have in mind include the featuring of images
of minority personnel in the employer's promotional materials, such
as brochures and websites. Another example would be the
appointment of a minority to a prominent position in the company,
such as an executive post or the board of directors. Showcasing also
includes verbal claims about the significance of women and minorities
in its company, or the publication of statistics that emphasize the role
or presence of such personnel. Our notion of showcasing includes, in
short, actions that feature, spotlight, publicize, or otherwise exhibit
the presence of individuals who would typically be regarded as
increasing a group's diversity.
If showcasing is the signaling behavior, what state of affairs does
that behavior evidence? We propose that the referent state that an
employer's showcasing behavior signals is a certain level of geniality
toward members of the showcased individual's group and a certain
kind of sensitivity or attitude about diversity in general.47 We might
47. Our claim about what is signaled by showcasing is similar to Brooke & Tyler's
claim that "if a company structures itself to treat all employees fairly and sends social
signals [to minority employees] emphasizing fairness . . . research has found increases in
performance and 'organizational commitment,' and decreases in turnover rates and
absenteeism." Brooke & Tyler, supra note 28, at 732-33. Like Brooke and Tyler, we are
inclined to take a deflationist view to characterizing what exactly is signaled by an
employer's diversity-oriented practices. The value of diversity in general is surely tied to
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say that an employer's showcasing of its minority constituents is in a
sense a second-order signal-a signal about its attitude toward
diversity, which (where it can be identified as such) might in turn
provide evidence that the employer is committed to norms of equality
and antidiscrimination. But it is the way in which the employer
showcases and presents the role of minority employees, officers, and
directors within its workforce that performs the explicit signaling
function, not the actual condition of diversity or lack thereof. What
the employer's showcasing behavior signals, specifically, is (1) the
ability to make itself attractive to individuals who would contribute to
diversity, such as members of the showcased individual's minority
group; (2) a disinclination to engage in openly discriminatory
employment action; and (3) a sensitivity to the significance of
diversity.
It would not be unfair to ask us at this point exactly what kind of
claim we think we are making here; and if it is an empirical one,
whether we have evidence to support it. We do not think we can deny
that ultimately, we are indeed making an empirical claim (as opposed,
say, to a definitional or purely logical one) about what can be inferred
from the behavior we have labeled as showcasing. It is a very limited
sort of empirical claim, though, with a distinctly interpretive
character. We are not making outright claims about employer
intentions or motivations generally. Our claim about the content of
the showcasing signal is an attempt to identify the most robust
inferences about an organization's attitudes with respect to the value
of diversity, equality, among others, that can reliably (i.e., more-or-
less inexorably) be drawn from any given observed instance of
showcasing behavior. Some might think that we are being too
cramped or stingy, maybe even cynical, in the inferences we are
prepared to allow. Recall, though, that our underlying objective is to
identify what is reliably signaled by a particular corporate behavior.
In order to do that, we must necessarily try to imagine the possibility
of intentionally disingenuous behavior. Some might also wonder
whether our claims are nothing more than appeals to common
intuition. But signals by their nature must work through common
understandings, so it does not seem to us particularly worrisome that
we do indeed rely on our own considered reflections in arriving at
possible interpretations of the various kinds of behaviors we are
the value of justice and equality, but we doubt that an employer's decision to showcase
minorities, even at the upper echelons of its workforce, can really be regarded as more
than a relatively minimal signal of a certain disinclination to discriminate and mindfulness
about diversity issues.
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considering. In the end, we fully recognize and accept that the
authoritativeness of the empirical, interpretive claims we are
articulating will ultimately depend on nothing more-and nothing
less-than their being shared by readers after reflection.48
Shifting the weight of the signaling function from the fact of
diversity to the employer's showcasing behavior does not require
denying that diversity may be evidentially valuable as an indicator of
a commitment to certain norms of equality. Thus, we fully agree that
we have reason to value diversity in the workplace insofar as we care
about the conditions and circumstances that are usually required to
produce it (and hence are evidenced by it). What we resist is the
appeal to the signaling value of diversity as an explanation of
employer practices in the nature of showcasing. Our proposal is to
turn the notion of diversity-as-signal upside down. The property of
diversity has a widely shared significance, and yet is vague, normative,
and contestable. Our model thus casts diversity as a value that drives
signaling behavior, rather than as a signal itself. What we are calling
showcasing is an example of behavior that can function as a signal of
the employer's attitudes about diversity. The key move is to
distinguish behaviors such as showcasing, which signal diversity and
attitudes about diversity, from the conditions that would actually
constitute diversity. Teasing apart these concepts allows for a
signaling model that more adequately explains employer behavior. As
our discussion below will show, these distinctions also create space for
a clearer, more critical analysis of the signaling rationale for diversity-
related employment practices.
Distinguishing behaviors that signal diversity from the condition
of diversity itself implies that one can exist without the other. This is
of central importance to our signaling model. An employer can
engage in signaling behavior with regard to diversity, such as
showcasing, whether or not the employer actually has a workforce
that enjoys significant diversity. If we are right in arguing that general
claims about diversity are normatively loaded and difficult for
observers to test, one might think that almost every employer with at
least some diversity will have an interest in engaging in showcasing
behavior (assuming there is a benefit to be gained by communicating
its diversity efforts to outsiders). But if all employers have an interest
in showcasing, and if the actual diversity of a workforce is very
difficult for an observer to determine independently, the obvious
48. We are grateful to Tristin Green for pressing us to consider these issues.
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question is how showcasing behavior could come to have any value at
all as a reliable signal.
The answer is that in our proposed signaling model, the referent
state that is evidenced by the showcasing signal is a sufficiently
minimal characteristic that the ability to send the signal is indeed a
reliable proxy for that characteristic. We are not claiming that
showcasing behavior functions as a signal of the existence of robust
diversity or even of an employer's genuine interest in achieving
diversity. It would be all too easy for an employer to engage in
showcasing behavior even in the absence of such conditions.49 What
we claim, to repeat, is that showcasing behavior signals (1) an ability
to attract members of the showcased individual's minority group, (2)
a certain disinclination to engage in open discrimination against that
group, and (3) a sensitivity or concern on the employer's part for its
reputation as an institution that supports diversity in respect of that
group.
This is not a signal that seems particularly prone to "faking." Not
every employer can send the showcasing signal. If an employer has
the ability to perform a showcasing signal, it will probably also have
the three attributes that we claim are putatively signaled. First, an
employer cannot engage in showcasing unless it actually has minority
personnel to showcase. This will require that the employer make itself
sufficiently attractive to such individuals to induce them to accept a
position. If it succeeds, it follows that the employer has the ability to
attract such individuals to its workplace community. Relatedly, an
employer who expends resources to make itself attractive to, and then
to showcase members of a particular minority group is not likely to
throw away the benefits gained by those expenditures by turning
around and openly discriminating against that same group.
And third, an employer that was not sensitive to its reputation
for diversity would be unlikely to understand or take seriously the
need to showcase its minority personnel and so probably would not
49. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 8, at 451.
50. This does not rule out the possibility that the employer would do so in hidden or
unintentional ways. A striking example of this unfortunate possibility is the recently
publicized Novartis story. See Novartis Fined $250 Million in Sex Discrimination Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2010, at B3. Over a long period of time, Novartis built up a reputation of
hospitability toward women in its workplace and was recognized as one of the best 100
companies for ten years running by Working Mother magazine. Id. Yet, in a federal
discrimination lawsuit brought by a number of female employees, a jury found that the
company had engaged in a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against
women during that same period and awarded the plaintiffs $3.3 million in compensatory
damages and $250 million in punitive dames. Id.
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make the effort to do so. Granted, an employer could engage in
showcasing without having any genuine interest in diversity, but it is
harder to imagine why an employer who had no concern for its
reputation regarding diversity would do so. An employer that
opposed having a positive reputation for diversity would in all
likelihood lack sufficient numbers of minority personnel to showcase
effectively, would find the notion of showcasing too distasteful to
countenance and therefore would not engage in it, or might simply
not want to make itself attractive to those who would perceive
minority showcasing as a positive signal.
It is possible, to be sure, that an employer might engage in
showcasing with respect to a particular minority individual without
meaning to advertise the individual's minority status, and without the
specific purpose of enhancing its diversity reputation: perhaps the
employer is simply proud of the individual being showcased. But it is
in the nature of a signal that an employer can engage in signaling
behavior without specifically intending to communicate the
correlated referent attributes. Whether or not the behavior is an
effective signal for those attributes depends only on whether the
behavior actually increases the probability that the sender (witting or
unwitting) does in fact possess those attributes." So, what about the
employer who sends the showcasing signal without having the
purpose of drawing attention to the showcased individual's minority
status? It seems to us that an employer that truly regards an
employee's minority status as merely accidental in that way will be
highly unlikely to be the kind of actor that would engage in open
discrimination. We are also inclined to believe that our imagined
"postracial" employer, even if it did not affirmatively tout diversity
ideals, will likely want to avoid developing a reputation of hostility to
diversity and so at least to that extent would in fact be sensitive to its
reputation in that regard. Thus, even in the case of the postracial
employer who "accidentally" engages in showcasing, the signal will
still be a reliable predictor of a disinclination to discriminate and a
sensitivity to its diversity reputation.
The next question is why observers would care about the
showcasing signal as we have described it. If there is no reliable
correlation between the showcasing signal and conditions of actual
diversity (or even a genuine interest in achieving diversity), why
51. Cf SKYRMS, supra note 18, at 8, 44-45 (stating that the way to measure "the
effectiveness of the sender's use of [a] signal[] to discriminate states ... is to measure the
extent that the use of that particular signal changes probabilities").
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would observers value that signal at all? Several possible answers are
consistent with our account. One is that it is widely understood that
robust levels of diversity are not only difficult to test for but also
difficult to actually achieve in many segments of the employment
market. Given this systemic reality, observers might come to regard a
company's attitudes toward the ideal of diversity, combined with a
demonstrated capacity for nondiscrimination, as a better indicator of
what kind of employer it is than the actual level of diversity that the
company has been able to achieve.
Another reason that observers might care about the showcasing
signal, even absent any correlation to genuine diversity, is that for at
least some (perhaps many) observers who are considering entering
into a relationship or transaction with a company, what matters on
the issue of diversity is not whether the company genuinely has it, but
whether associating with the company creates risks of being
victimized by discrimination or of suffering vicarious reputational
harm as a result of that company's misdeeds. What such observers
may seek is reliable evidence that the company's orientation on
matters of workplace equality is within socially acceptable limits. The
showcasing signal provides precisely such comfort, insofar as it
assures that the company does not engage in open discrimination and
is sensitive to its reputation on diversity matters.
A third, more troubling possibility is that certain kinds of
showcasing behaviors, in combination with an obvious lack of
meaningful levels of actual diversity in the company's workforce,
might signal that while the company is aware of the social significance
of diversity and is sensitive to its reputation on that score, the
company has not sought to implement meaningful measures or
structural reforms that would actually produce robust levels of
workplace diversity. It is possible that observers who feel threatened
by such affirmative measures and reforms but who wish to avoid a
reputation for hostility to diversity ideals would view the showcasing
signal in the absence of genuine diversity in a positive light; that is, as
an assurance that while the company is aware of social norms
recognizing the importance of diversity as an ideal, it still otherwise
manages its workforce in a relatively conservative, colorblind fashion.
IV. NORMATIVE AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
We have argued that diversity as such is not the kind of
characteristic that can function effectively as a signal,52 and we have
52. See discussion supra Part II.
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suggested that the putative signaling behavior that is commonly
observed in the context of corporate hiring is more accurately
characterized as the showcasing of individuals who ostensibly increase
the diversity of the organization in some respect." Because this
showcasing behavior is not a reliable signal of the actual existence of
the sort of diversity that could, in turn, be evidence of an ethos of
fairness, nondiscrimination, and equality, we have proposed that such
behavior might be understood as a signal of the company's ability to
attract and disinclination to discriminate against members of the
showcased individual's minority group, and a sensitivity to its
reputation on diversity matters.54
All of the foregoing discussion has been primarily concerned
with trying to explain the corporate interest in increasing or touting
its workforce diversity in highly visible ways, such as by placing
women or members of minority groups in high-ranking positions like
the board of directors. In this last section, we take a more normative
turn and apply a critical perspective to the instrumental, showcasing
approach to diversity we have been describing. We explore potential
criticisms from within the perspective that regards diversity as
something that we have reason to value evidentially; that is, as a
manifestation of the proper functioning of those institutions that
actually have it and then from the perspective of Title VII's
prohibition of workplace discrimination.
A. General Normative Considerations
The claim that a particular behavior provides a signal of some
hidden state is primarily a descriptive claim about the informational
content of certain social practices," consisting partly in an appeal to
shared social understandings of common behaviors, and partly in a
quasi-conceptual or interpretive analysis of the more-or-less
inexorable implications of those behaviors.56 The claims that we have
made to this point about showcasing have been, in any event, in this
vein.57 Furthermore, the signaling value of showcasing can be, as
explained above, independent of an employer's actual reasons for
engaging in it." Thus, assigning a signaling function to a particular
53. See discussion supra Part III.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
55. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 18, at 18-22; Broome & Krawiec, supra note 8,
at 447-50.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
57. See supra Part III.
58. See supra text accompanying note 51 (explaining how even accidental showcasing
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behavior does not necessarily imply that sending the signal is the only
possible reason for engaging in that behavior. Once the signaling
function of a particular behavior in a given context becomes
understood, however, it becomes likely that actors will engage in that
behavior for the specific purpose of sending the associated signal.
Presumably, employers and their various observers recognize the
signaling content of showcasing. This opens up the possibility that
some employers engage in that behavior for the specific-and
perhaps exclusive-purpose of sending the associated signal. When
an employer acts in this way-that is, when it seeks to rationalize its
showcasing behavior in terms of its signaling function-it is implicitly
making a claim that the behavior is justified by that function; that is,
that the signaling function provides good reasons for that behavior.
That sort of claim is plainly a normative one that warrants critical
examination.
Potentially the most serious objection to showcasing for the
purpose of signaling is that this way of understanding the action
evinces a lack of respect for the individuals who are so showcased.
Treating the significance of an employer's relation with such
individuals as dependent primarily on their signaling value, their
value as instruments of implicit communication, is corrosive to their
status in the organizational community.5 9 For an employer to regard
its reasons for minority hiring, for example, as reducible to the value
that such hiring has in signaling the employer's ability to win such
hires in a competitive marketplace is to come dangerously close to
regarding the worth of a minority hire as something akin to that of a
prized trophy: valuable as an emblem of the effort required to win it,
but not something that possesses any value in itself. This is an
objectionable way of regarding any person. The idea of using persons,
by dint of the racial or other social categories to which they belong, as
might still function as an effective signal of nondiscrimination and reputational concern).
59. Our point is slightly different from the argument, commonly heard in the
affirmative action context, that race-conscious preference can have a "backlash" effect or
create a "stigma" for minority groups. See, e.g., Christopher A. Bracey, The Cul de Sac of
Race Preference Discourse, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1275-93 (2006); Jack Greenberg,
Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 521, 582-89 (2002); Angela Onwuachi-Willig et al., Cracking the Egg: Which Came
First-Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1299 passim (2008); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action,
64 TUL. L. REV. 1609, 1622-24 (1990). The backlash/stigma argument boils down to a
claim that preferential treatment can exacerbate negative stereotypes and attitudes toward
minorities. See Green, supra note 4, at 644-45. What we argue is slightly more abstract:
that treating an individual as mere signal amounts to a failure to see the individual as a
person of respect.
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mere emblems or trophies-indeed, as nothing more than living
certificates attesting to an employer's good will and effort-entails a
failure of moral respect for those individuals. To rationalize minority
hiring as a form of signaling is blatantly to reduce the value of
minorities who are hired to their functional status as passive emblems
rather than as actively contributing members of the community. The
signaling rationale, understood as a putative reason for diversity-
oriented employment practices, views minority hires as purely
instrumental means to the accomplishment of the employer's further
business objectives rather than as ends in themselves, members of a
cooperative enterprise entitled to moral consideration and concern.60
An additional, related objection to the justification of minority
hiring specifically for the purpose of sending the showcasing signal is
that this way of thinking about the value of such hiring is potentially
counterproductive to the proper internalization of nondiscriminatory
attitudes throughout the workplace.6 1 To the extent that the
justification of high-profile minority hires in terms of the signal that
such actions would send tends to displace justifications in terms of the
merits of the individuals hired, one might worry that reliance on the
signaling rationale might invite an implicit assumption that those
hiring decisions would not have been justified on the substantive
merits,62 which might in turn have negative consequences for the
individuals hired 6 ' and be detrimental to the promotion of genuinely
shared, internalized attitudes of mutual respect and equality of
concern among all members of the workplace.'
Paradoxically, then, to rationalize the practice of diversity hiring
as a form of signaling undercuts the basic premise that animates the
evidential view of the value of diversity. This view regards the
existence of diversity in certain institutional settings as valuable
60. To be clear, this is an objection to thinking of showcasing behavior, such as the
hiring of women or minorities for prominent positions, as justified by its signaling
function. The point is not that such behavior is unjustifiable, but that the signaling
rationale does not provide good reasons for it.
61. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of
Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1893-94
(2009).
62. See, e.g., Green, supra note 4, at 599.
63. See id. (citing David B. Wilkins, From "Separate is Inherently Equal" to "Diversity
is Good for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the
Black Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1597-98 (2004)) (discussing feelings of exploitation
that can result when an individual believes he was hired solely for signaling purposes).
64. See Madeline E. Heilman, Affirmative Action's Contradictory Consequences, J.
SOC. ISSUES, Winter 1996, at 105, 107-08 (arguing that race- or sex-based preferences in
hiring can be deleterious to workplace equality).
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because it evidences the operation of a socially progressive ethos of
equality, fairness, and nondiscrimination.6 5 The signaling rationale for
the practice of showcasing diversity, because it embeds a conception
of the individuals being showcased as passive instrumental emblems
whose value has little to do with their active agency, and because it
might be corrosive to the sort of internal attitudes that we should
want to promote in the workplace, seems incompatible with that
ethos.
We are not denying that the diversity of a population within an
institutional setting may be regarded as good partly because it
evidences certain good things about the institution. Diversity in
certain contexts is surely a state of affairs that is at least to some
extent symptomatic of institutional adherence to norms of
nondiscrimination and a commitment to fairness and equality of
opportunity. This evidential value of diversity, however, does not
immunize from criticism every action that tends to bring it about.
Diversity may be a symptom of the observance of norms that we
value, but it obviously does not follow that those norms justify all, or
even any, means of creating that symptomatic state of affairs. A wet
nose may be a symptom that a dog is in good health, but it does not
follow that concern for a dog's health provides good reason to splash
water on its nose. Doing so might make it appear to observers that
the dog is healthy, but (for all we know) it might actually harm the
dog. Similarly, an institution that hires minority personnel for their
showcase value might succeed in signaling that the institution is
healthy in certain ways, but the attitudes implicit in that way of
thinking about the value of those persons seems morally pernicious.
Given how apparent it is that the signaling rationale for
showcasing diversity is objectionable on the grounds that it is
inconsistent with moral respect for persons and potentially
counterproductive to the internalization of antidiscrimination norms,
why is the practice so much in vogue? We suspect that all of us have
personal acquaintance with hiring decisions in our own institutions
that have at least a flavor of showcasing. We would venture,
moreover, that most of us have acquiesced to, facilitated, participated
in, and maybe even celebrated those very practices. Is there anything
to be said in their defense?
It bears repeating that our objection to the signaling rationale as
a justification for what we have been calling showcasing does not
entail a general objection to all employment practices that might be
65. See Shin, supra note 11, at 1195-99.
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characterized as showcasing. The inadequacy of the signaling function
as a reason for appointing a woman or a minority individual to the
board of directors obviously does not mean that there are no good
reasons. Nor does our rejection of the signaling rationale as
justification for such an appointment imply that the candidate's status
as a woman or as a minority cannot provide good reason for it. The
objection to the signaling rationale is that it implies a morally
offensive way of thinking about the value of diversity-oriented hiring
or promotional practices. It is not a claim that race- or gender-
conscious hiring cannot be justified, and we have no interest in
putting forward such a claim.
Consider, for example, the argument that certain race-conscious
hiring practices are justified because they are good for the institutions
that practice them, or good for society overall.66 A possible
consequence of the appointment of a minority individual to a very
visible corporate position such as the board of directors is that it
might empower the individual to work as a role model for future
generations of historically underprivileged minorities, who might
otherwise have abandoned as futile the sort of personal commitment
required to achieve that kind of success.67 The desirability of that
consequence might be thought to provide a good reason for
appointing a person of color, as opposed to a nonminority, to the
position in question, and then showcasing that person to outside
observers.
A similar argument is that the appointment of minority
personnel to visible positions within the workforce might have certain
desirable psychological "debiasing" effects.68 According to social
psychological research highlighted by Jerry Kang and others,
increasing the direct exposure and contact that employees have with
members of minority groups can have the consequence of reducing
the influence of implicit biases on workplace decision making and in
the context of other interaction involving members of historically
excluded minority groups.69 Again, the desirability of that sort of
consequence might be thought to provide good reasons for various
66. For a review of such arguments, see Shin, supra note 11, at 1191-95.
67. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (suggesting that the presence of
diversity in elite institutions could create a visible "path to leadership" for underprivileged
minorities); see also Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 30-32 (2002) (discussing the "role model" argument for
affirmative action). For further discussion of Grutter, see infra Part IV.B.
68. See, e.g., Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1101-02.
69. See id.
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kinds of diversity hiring practices-the same kinds of practices to
which we might tend to attach signaling value.
These consequentialist justifications for showcasing diversity are
not objectionable in the same way that the signaling rationale seems
to be. They do not involve regarding minority hires as passive
emblems whose value is unrelated to their active agency. Regarding
someone as a role model implicates pride, respect, and admiration for
the individual so cast as a moral agent." Regarding someone as a
"debiasing agent" does imply a more overtly instrumentalist
perspective, but the notion of debiasing is ultimately about
normalizing the way in which members of the workplace relate to
each other, presumably including the "debiasing agents" themselves.
At least in this way, the debiasing rationale does not regard minority
personnel as mere tokens, or passive instruments of transmission, but
rather as persons who, by their interactions in the workplace, have a
capacity to change the way that others relate to them (and by some
process of psychological habituation, to all minorities).
Still, there is little question that these consequentialist
justifications for diversity-based hiring practices have a decidedly
peculiar character, at least from the perspective of the evidential view
of the value of diversity. The basic idea of the debiasing rationale, for
example, is that by taking affirmative measures to make itself more
diverse, an employer might enjoy, as salubrious side effects, the
promotion of nondiscriminatory attitudes in its workplace 7 -the very
sort of attitudes that the existence of diversity is supposed to
evidence. Whether or not the desired attitudes will in fact result from
the diversity that is created is an empirical question on which we do
not take any particular position here. There is perhaps a lingering
worry that the use of diversity-based hiring in order to bring about
desirable attitudes among the workforce has a certain character of
manipulation, as of social-psychological engineering. Maybe in the
end, the worry is not well founded; it is not as if such practices involve
deception or coercion.72 Perhaps such practices are precisely what are
70. Cf Schuck, supra note 67, at 30-32 (supporting the role model justification for
affirmative action). But cf Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device:
Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1222, 1226-29 (1991)
(critiquing the role model justification for affirmative action).
71. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1101-15 (explaining the "social contact
hypothesis," "countertypical exemplars," and "debiasing agents").
72. Indeed, insofar as actors in the workplace freely and reasonably consent to
whatever particular instrumental roles they are asked to fulfill (presumably for the
ultimate purpose of maximizing the firm's profits or otherwise advancing its mission), the
objection of exploitation or disrespect loses much of its force. The signaling rationale is
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necessary to make further progress toward our shared goals of a truly
nondiscriminatory workplace and conditions that constitute genuinely
fair equality of opportunity. And perhaps the sort of active, visible
behavior that we have characterized as showcasing is what will most
likely lead actors in all workplaces to fully internalize the norms of
nondiscrimination that are necessary to achieving meaningfully
robust and durable conditions of diversity.73 But that too is an
empirical question. And, more relevantly to our point, that sort of
justification is not objectionable in the same way that the signaling
rationale is.
B. Legal Justifications
In this final section, we note the unsettled nature of the legality
of making decisions to hire minority personnel on the basis of what
they would add to the visible diversity of the employer's workforce;
that is, their showcase value, and discuss how such practices fit in the
legal landscape.74
The Supreme Court laid the foundation of its approach to
affirmative action under Title VII in United Steelworkers of America
v. Weber75 and Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County."6 In those cases, the Court held that it was permissible, under
certain limited circumstances," for employers to consider an
individual's membership in a minority group as a positive reason in
favor of hiring that individual. The concept of diversity as such played
morally offensive insofar as it implicates a view of the showcased individual-a passive
emblem, a mere trophy-that is inconsistent with moral respect and which we could not
reasonably ask that individual to accept.
73. Cf Bartlett, supra note 6, at 1936-41 (describing ways in which the law can
"thwart the internalization process" of nondiscrimination norms).
74. These observations about the significance of the interest in diversity to Title VII
do not specifically apply to appointments to a corporation's board of directors because
directors generally are not regarded as employees for purposes of the statute. See generally
Ann C. McGinley, Functionality or Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as "Employees"
Under the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 SMU L. REv. 3 (2004) (discussing the legal
definition of an employee).
75. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
76. 480 U.S. 616 (1986).
77. In Weber and Johnson, the Court held that a voluntary affirmative action plan was
permissible under Title VII if it was "designed to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in
traditionally segregated job categories," the plan was consistent with the statutory
objective of "[breaking] down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy," did not
"unnecessarily trammel the interests" of nonbeneficiaries of the plan nor create "an
absolute bar" to their advancement, and was a temporary measure to eliminate "manifest
imbalance" rather than a permanent one designed to maintain particular proportions.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628-31 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reciting the elements of
the Weber test).
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no explicit role in the basis of the Court's approval of the affirmative
action plans in Weber and Johnson." The affirmative action plans at
issue in those cases were justified as a way for employers to break
free from historical patterns in which minorities and women had been
actively excluded from, and barred from advancing within, certain
segments of the workplace. 79 Race- and gender-conscious decision
making was conceptualized as a remedy for gross inequalities of
distribution, a direct countermeasure to past practices of denying
employment opportunities based on those factors.80 There was little
suggestion in the Court's opinions that increasing the racial and
gender balance of the workplace was justified by the value of
diversity as such or any indirect benefits that might be thought to
derive from diversity." The operative notion was instead that
increasing the workplace representation of groups that historically
had suffered from exclusion and deprivation could be justified as a
direct response to the very same problems of unjust denial of
opportunity and distributive inequality that Title VII was meant to
address.
The notion that race-conscious decision making could be justified
by an interest in diversity, rather than as a brute remedial measure to
reverse the effects of historical exclusion, received its first major
articulation in Justice Powell's concurrence in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke," which was decided a year before
Weber.' In Bakke, which involved a constitutional equal protection
challenge to race-based affirmative action in a medical school
admissions policy, Justice Powell argued that the "attainment of a
diverse student body" constituted a compelling interest that could
justify the consideration of race as a positive decision-making factor.s
For Justice Powell, however, the value of diversity in a student body
78. See id. at 628-42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-07.
79. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628-42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-07. But cf Cynthia L.
Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the
Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 10-14 (2005) (proposing a somewhat
broader, nonremedial reading of Weber and Johnson).
80. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628-42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-07; Estlund, supra note
79, at 10-14.
81. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628-42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-07; Estlund, supra note
79, at 10-14.
82. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628-42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-07; Estlund, supra note
79, at 10-14.
83. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
84. Id. at 265 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 311-14.
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was largely derivative of the "discourse benefits"86 that could be
expected from placing individuals with different social and cultural
perspectives together in a shared educational environment.8
Almost twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court revisited the
diversity rationale as a constitutional justification of educational
affirmative action" in Grutter v. Bollinger.89 There, Justice O'Connor
in her majority opinion endorsed Justice Powell's suggestion in Bakke
that the academic discourse benefits that flow from a diverse student
body could justify the consideration of minority racial membership as
a factor in admissions decision making.' Justice O'Connor went
further, however, by asserting that diversity was valuable not just
because of expected discourse benefits, but also because the
promotion of diversity in selective educational institutions would help
better prepare all students to deal with racial difference in their
future careers, help realize ideals of democratic inclusion and equal
citizenship, and perhaps most interestingly for our purposes, to create
a "path to leadership" and help "cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry. "91
Although Grutter did not address the permissibility of race-
conscious decision making under Title VII, it appeared to open up the
theoretical possibility that the Court might one day92 adapt and
extend the diversity rationale to that statutory context. That
possibility was somewhat diminished by the Court's decision in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
86. Thomas H. Lee, University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of
Diversity, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2305-06 (2004).
87. SCHUCK, supra note 42, at 164-65.
88. The Court had, of course, decided a number of constitutional challenges to
affirmative action plans, but none of those cases raised the issue of whether the diversity
justification for affirmative action was valid. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)
(suggesting that the Court's cases since Bakke "might be read to suggest that remedying
past discrimination is the only permissible justification" for affirmative action).
89. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
90. Id. at 325.
91. Id. at 330-32. See generally Patrick S. Shin, Compelling Interest, Forbidden Aim:
The Antinomy of Grutter and Gratz, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 431 (2005) (analyzing the
implications of Grutter and Gratz for legal understandings of the value of racial diversity).
92. Before Grutter, the Court had granted certiorari in a case that would have directly
addressed the question of the legality of race-conscious employment decisions based on
"nonremedial" rationales such as the interest in diversity, but the parties settled the case
before argument. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1549-50 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
93. Cf Estlund, supra note 79, at 35-36 (considering the implications of Grutter in the
context of employment under Title VII).
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1,94 in which a fractured majority invalidated a school district's race-
conscious procedures for assigning children to particular schools
within the district." Although five members of the Court reaffirmed
Grutter's holding that an interest in diversity (in the educational
context) could justify race-conscious decision making to the extent
necessary to bring it about, Justice Kennedy in his pivotal
concurrence argued that the school district's assignment procedures
were objectionable because they were too "crude": they
"threaten[ed] to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded
according to one school's supply and another's demand."9 6 Thus, for
Justice Kennedy, the value of diversity had to be subordinated to a
constitutional requirement of respect for persons, and regarding
individuals as nothing more than bankable chits whose value
depended on their race violated that requirement. 97
Finally and most recently, in Ricci v. DeStefano,98 the Supreme
Court considered whether it was permissible, under the prong of Title
VII that prohibits intentional discrimination (disparate treatment), 9 9
for a city to scuttle the results of an exam administered to firefighters
competing for promotions based on a belief that, due to a
disproportionately low number of minority firefighters receiving
qualifying scores, the city's certification of the results might result in
its exposure to liability under the other prong of Title VII, which
prohibits employment practices that create differentially worse
outcomes for members of a particular racial group (disparate
impact).1" The Ricci case did not involve an affirmative action policy,
and its actual holding is about the interrelation between the disparate
treatment and disparate impact paradigms of Title VII.o' The
particulars of that holding are not important for our discussion here.
What is noteworthy is that the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, seemed to take for granted that Title VII's prohibition
against intentional discrimination requires strict colorblindness in the
context of employment decision making." Whether the Court will
94. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
95. See id. at 707-11.
96. Id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 797-98.
98. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
99. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
100. § 2000e-2(k).
101. For general discussion of Ricci, see Zimmer, supra note 7, at 2-8.
102. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673. For example, in arguing that the City of New Haven
violated the disparate treatment provision of Title VII by taking into account the race of
the firefighters who scored highly on the qualifying exam, even though the City did this
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take this assumption seriously in a case that squarely raises the issue
of affirmative action under Title VII remains to be seen, but Ricci
should chasten any expectation that the Court will take its next
available opportunity to extend the diversity rationale for affirmative
action to justify race-conscious employment action under Title VII.
Perhaps it will in fact do so, but that result seems far from a foregone
conclusion. 0 3
At this juncture, then, the legal status of race- or gender-
conscious hiring practices under Title VII is at best uncertain. What
seems beyond doubt, however, is that diversity initiatives on the part
of private employers have expanded over the past few decades.'0
How many of these employer diversity initiatives truly involve
affirmative action in the sense of preferential treatment on the basis
of a protected characteristic is not clear, but it seems to us just a
matter of time before the Court takes up the question of the
permissible limits of race- and gender-conscious decision making
under Title VII. The question, in any event, seems ripe for decision.
What, then, can be said about the legality of an employer's
practice of hiring minorities to visible positions for the purpose of
showcasing its diversity? If the Court decides to move away from
Weber and Johnson, what should it conclude about the permissibility
of such a practice under Title VII? If one were to decide the question
from first principles,"os it might make sense to begin by thinking about
the basic purposes of Title VII: to make "the workplace ... an
environment free of discrimination, where race is not a barrier to
only because it thought it was required to do so by the disparate impact provision of Title
VII, Justice Kennedy said that the "analysis begins with this premise: The City's actions
would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense."
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, for Justice Kennedy, the mere fact that the City's decision to
reject the results of the firefighters' exam involved consideration of the race of the
firefighters was sufficient to make that decision prima facie discriminatory, even though
that decision was motivated by nothing other than a desire to avoid a racially disparate
impact. Id. For additional arguments that Ricci effectively reads a requirement of
colorblindness into Title VII, see Zimmer, supra note 7, at 8-24.
103. For an excellent general discussion of the current legal status of nonremedial
rationales for race- and sex-conscious decision making in the workplace, see Green, supra
note 4, at 614-28.
104. See id. at 596-97.
105. Note that the relevant statutory text of Title VII does not itself necessarily militate
in favor of a requirement of strict colorblindness, Justice Kennedy's assumptions in Ricci
notwithstanding. The central liability provision states only that it is "an unlawful
employment practice" for an employer "to discriminate ... because of" race, color, sex,
and so on; but "discriminate" is not itself defined in the statute, let alone defined in a way
that would require regarding all race- or sex-conscious decision making as constituting
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
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opportunity";'0 6 " 'to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications,
rather than on the basis of race or color' ";10 and to "remov[e] ...
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classification.""os With these statutory goals in
view, we can then ask how the Court should evaluate the practice of
hiring members of underrepresented groups for their signaling or
showcase value.109
When one puts the question this way, it becomes clear that the
signaling rationale for diversity hiring works no better as a legal
justification than as a moral one.'10 If the point of diversity hiring lies
in its signaling value, then it becomes quite awkward to argue that
such hiring can be justified as a way of advancing the substantive
goals of Title VII."' The argument is awkward because it seems to
muddle correlation with causation. It might very well be true that
firms that have more racially and gender-diverse workplaces are
likely those that treat their employees fairly, equally, respectfully, and
with all due concern for their individual interests. Encouraging the
construction of such an environment is surely a central goal of Title
VII.112 But is that goal served when an employer engages in a practice
of recruiting high-profile minority or female employees for the
purpose of making it appear to observers (inside and outside the
firm) that the employer enjoys that kind of environment?"' Could
one not argue that this is nothing more than splashing water on the
dog's nose so as to make others believe that it is healthy?
106. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674.
107. Id. at 2675 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971)).
108. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
109. For a similar but more general inquiry not limited to showcasing behavior, see
Green, supra note 4, at 614-39.
110. See supra Part IV.A.
111. Cf Green, supra note 4, at 621 (arguing that the business interest in "signaling
fairness" does not justify race- and sex-conscious decision making under Title VII).
112. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674-75; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; see also Burlington Indus.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (discussing Title VII's goal of encouraging employers
to take affirmative measures to reduce the risk of discrimination); Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) (describing the primary purpose of Title VII and the
responsibilities of both employers and employees).
113. David Wilkins discusses this issue in the law firm context, where he asks "Is the
Business Case for Diversity Good for the Diversity of Large Law Firms?" Wilkins, supra
note 63, at 1591. Wilkins specifically points to the incentive for these big law firms to cook
the diversity numbers so as to try to appear more diverse to prospective employees. See id.
at 1591-99. For firms to spend resources engaging in this kind of window dressing, Wilkins
argues, does little to advance the goals of racial justice, which presumably is the end goal.
See id. at 1599-1611.
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From the perspective of the goals of Title VII, as from the more
general normative perspective we considered earlier, the signaling
rationale seems to undermine the justification of diversity-based
hiring, even though it might explain why in fact employers actually
engage in it. We should not necessarily conclude, however, that the
sort of diversity hiring to which employers attach signaling value
cannot be justified in terms of the goals of Title VII. (Employers
might be doing the "right" thing albeit for the wrong reasons.)
Offhand, it seems tempting to believe that the most robust workplace
diversity is the sort of diversity that arises naturally from merits-
driven employment decision making by actors who have genuinely
internalized a strong commitment to norms of antidiscrimination and
equality of opportunity and advancement for all. Diversity on this
picture is the product or symptom of a process that works from the
inside, out.
The difficulty, however, as the social-psychological literature of
the past fifteen years has established, is that this inside-out model of
realizing conditions of equality in the workplace may be unrealistic.'14
This model assumes that actors, so long as they have internalized a
commitment to nondiscrimination, will tend to make employment
decisions that will naturally tend to increase the diversity of the
workplace. But this might be false. Implicit biases, unconscious
stereotyping beliefs, and other hidden psychological factors might
dispose actors to make decisions that tend to limit diversity rather
than increase it, even while the actor genuinely professes a
commitment to equality and diversity."s It might be that the only way
to eradicate those persistent, stubborn, and hidden biases is to work
from the outside, in. This is what we understand to be the point of the
debiasing strategy that scholars like Jerry Kang and Christine Jolls
have discussed.' On the outside-in model, diversity is a means, a
psychologically effective tool for eliminating implicit bias, which in
114. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 962; Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at
1064.
115. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 962; see also David L. Faigman et al., A
Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1389, 1404-05 (2008) (arguing that people are often unaware of significant factors that
influence their motivations).
116. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 969, 988 (2006) ("In a variety of ways, existing law and policy seek to
respond to the problem of implicit bias; imaginable reforms could do far more."); Kang &
Banaji, supra note 6, at 1077 ("[R]esponding to discrimination means not only remedying
present acts of discrimination but also preventing discrimination that is likely to occur
without some proactive action.").
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turn would be expected to produce fair decision making that would
then tend to regenerate that diversity more organically (from the
inside, out)."' Thus, although the signaling rationale for diversity
hiring seems unresponsive to the goals of Title VII, it might
nevertheless be that the very kind of hiring that carries signaling
(showcase) value might be effective in generating, outside in, lasting
conditions of fairness and true equality of opportunity in the
workplace.
There is also reason to think that if the outside-in model can be
borne out as an empirical matter, allowing employers to engage in
diversity hiring will in the long run tend to reduce the efficacy of the
signaling incentive while improving conditions of equality overall.
Employers who want to hire minority personnel for showcasing
purposes will end up giving high wages to (or spend more on
recruiting) a small group of individuals. To shift a handful of high-
profile women and minorities from one employer to another does not
do much to raise overall welfare, let alone further social justice, in any
meaningful sense. Indeed, a market in which such high-profile
individuals are traded back and forth in zero-sum transfers just for
their showcasing value exemplifies precisely the sort of attitude that
was denounced by Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved-treating
persons as if they were nothing more than racial "chits" to be
collected and traded for purely derivative value."1 But one can expect
that with sufficient demand, more women and minorities will enter
the market and be hired by employers who want to mimic their
competitors who have made similar appointments. If the elimination
of bias and the realization of attitudes of nondiscrimination really can
be achieved from the outside in, then this behavior by employers
might end up producing socially desirable consequences (even though
the employers would have been acting for objectionable reasons).
Those consequences include the reduction of implicit bias in
employment decision making, which would naturally tend to increase
even further the numbers of workers who had traditionally been the
victims of such bias. Gradually, the hiring of such a worker would
cease to seem remarkable and would no longer carry signaling value.
Ironically, it is perhaps that situation more than any other, that is, the
state of affairs in which the visible hiring of a minority carried no
117. See Green, supra note 4, at 604.
118. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 798
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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signaling value in particular, that would indicate true progress toward
the goals of workplace antidiscrimination laws.
CONCLUSION
At bottom, the simple signaling rationale for race- or gender-
conscious hiring stands on shaky justificatory ground as a matter of
economics, law, and morality. The hiring of minority personnel to
visible positions for their showcase value-"trophy hiring," to put it
crassly-may very well be an effective means of signaling an
employer's geniality toward minority groups or women, and its
sensitivity to the social significance of diversity. But the more
widespread this sort of showcasing becomes over time, the less
meaningful the content of the associated signal will be. If most
employers are engaging in this behavior, the practice begins to
resemble a norm, and a negative reputational cost attaches to a firm's
inability to make a showcase-worthy hire. If everyone is doing it, then
showcase hiring becomes little more than a precondition to a firm's
acceptance into polite society. Maybe this describes the state of affairs
in which we already find ourselves. On the other hand, maybe we are
overestimating the prevalence of these practices. (We are not so
sure.)
But what we want to drive home is this: as practitioners and
participants in diversity-oriented hiring practices, we cannot be
content with justifying those practices in reference to their signaling
value, as reflected in the increasingly trite idea that they "send a
positive message." Our reasons for our diversity-promoting practices
cannot possibly be so empty, so nonaspirational, and so devoid of
respect for our fellow colleagues and candidates. To be sure, it is in
the nature of a signal that we do not control how observers will
understand our actions. And perhaps it is in our social nature to
signal others that we are, and we belong to institutions that are, of the
"good type." But we must not mistake the signaling value of our
diversity-hiring practices for reasons that provide adequate
justification for them. That mistaken view-the view that our
diversity-oriented efforts are justified by the positive message they
send about us-is corrosive to the values of respect and equality that
underlie our concern for diversity in the first place.
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